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 ―JUST  LIKE  LITTLE  DOGS‖: 
 
THE  LAW  SHOULD  SPEAK  WITH  VERACITY  AND  RESPECT  
   




    
     ―So we walked along the sands towards the dunes,‖ Tom said, ―and  [my brother] 
Walter was with Doris and  I was with Norma.  Norma worked in the steam laundry.  
We hadn‘t been walking and talking for more than a few minutes when, by God, I knew 
I was head over heels in love with the girl, and she wasn‘t the pretty one, either.‖ 
 
       He described her.  I saw her clearly.  Her plump, kind face, jolly brown eyes, warm 
wide mouth, thick bobbed hair . . . .  
 
       ―Doris was the pretty one,‖ said Tom, ―smart and touched up and sharp as a knife.  I 
was twenty-six years old and I‘d never been in love, and there I was, gawking at Norma 
in the middle of Tawe sands, too frightened to put my finger on her gloves.  Walter had 
his arm round Doris then.‖ 
 
       They sheltered behind a dune.  The night dropped down on them quickly.  Walter 
was a caution with Doris, hugging and larking, and Tom sat close to Norma, brave 
enough to hold her hand and tell her all his secrets.  He told her his age and his job.  He 
liked staying in in the evenings with a good book. . . . Norma and Doris were sisters. . . . 
 
       Now the story-telling . . . gave place to the loving night in the dunes. . . . {Tom‘s 
hands were] on Norma‘s breast.  ―Don‘t you dare!‖  Walter and Doris lay quietly near 
them.  You could have heard a safety pin fall. 
 
      ―‗And the curious thing was,‖ said Tom, ―that after a time we all sat up on the sand 
and smiled at each other.  And we all moved softly about on the sand in the dark, 
without saying a word.  And Doris was lying with me, and Norma was with Walter.‖ 
 
      ―But why did you change over, if you loved her?‖ I asked.  ‖I never understood 
why,‖ said Tom.  ―I think about it every night.‖ . . . . And Tom continued: ―We didn‘t see 
much of the girls until July.  I couldn‘t face Norma.  Then they brought two paternity 
orders against us, and Mr. Lewis,  the magistrate, was eighty years old, and stone deaf,  
                                               
1  J.D. Harvard.  B.C.L., Oxford.  Member of the Massachusetts bar.  Thanks, for their 
assistance, to Professor James Gordley, W.R. Irby Chair in Law, Tulane University 
School of Law, and to Cosmin Dariescu, Lecturer L.L.D at the Faculty of Law of  
Alexandru Loan Cuza University of Lasi, Romania.  Thanks, for research assistance, to 
Karaen Breda of the Boston College Law School library.   
 
Copyright 2009 by Scott FitzGibbon. 
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too.  He put a little trumpet by his ear and Norma and Doris gave evidence.  Then we 
gave evidence, and he couldn‘t decide whose was which.    
 
       ―And at the end he shook his head back and fore and pointed his trumpet and said: 
‗Just like little dogs!‘‖ 
 
       All at once I remembered how cold it was.  I rubbed my numb hands together. . . . 
―What happened then?‖ I asked. Walter answered.  ―I married Norma,‖ he said ―and 
Tom married Doris.  We had to do the right thing by them, didn‘t we?  That‘s why  Tom 
won‘t go home.  He never goes home till the early morning.  I‘ve got to keep him 
company.  He‘s my brother.‖ 
 
                -- Dylan Thomas, Just Like Little Dogs.2 
 
  
―[S]pouse‖ means a spouse as defined in subsection 1(1), and in addition includes either 
of two persons who are not married to each other and have cohabited. 
 
                              - - Ontario Family Law Act3 
 
 
The ordinances of the Lord are true.  
                                                 -- Psalm 194 
 
             
I.  INTRODUCTION.  
 
       This article proposes veracity and respect as basic guides for law.   It thus 
supplements dominant lines of thought which emphasize instrumentalist 
criteria5 such as promoting efficiency, maximizing utility, and deterring and 
remedying harm.        
                                               
2  In DYLAN THOMAS, THE COLLECTED STORIES 174, 178-79 (1938).  In the original, 
some of the paragraphing is different than as here quoted.  
3 R.S.O. 1990, c. F-.3, s. 29.  This definition is discussed in Part V of this Article. 
4  Psalm 19:9, THE NEW OXFORD ANNOTATED BIBLE:  NEW REVISED STANDARD 
VERSION WITH THE APOCRYPHA (3d ed. 1995). Compare Psalm 19:10,  TANAKH:  
THE HOLY SCRIPTURES:  THE NEW JPS TRANSLATION ACCORDING TO THE 
TRADITIONAL HEBREW TEXT 1126 (Jewish Publications Society, 1985): ―the 
judgments of the LORD are true.‖  
 
5 See  Brian Z. Tamanaha, "The Perils of Pervasive Legal Instrumentalism,"  Montesquieu 
Lecture Series, Tilburg University, Vol. 1, 2005 (available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=725582  (abstract): 
 3 
 
       This article proposes that it is a great good for a judge, a legislator, and all  
who speak as the law to exercise the virtue of veracity and to speak with respect, 
and that it is especially bad in the case of such legal officers to depart from those 
practices.6   It points out some implications for family law. 
 
A.  Mendacity:   Some Reflections. 
 
        This century of horrors from which we have just exited experienced, it has 
been said, a crisis of solidarity:7  a ―great disruption‖ which "weakened the 
bonds holding families, neighborhoods, and nations together."8  More 
fundamentally, the Twentieth Century bought with it severe crises of political 
and social truthfulness.   It endured sustained assaults on the practices of 
veracity.  It witnessed the determined propagation of comprehensive systems of 
false belief.   
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
―In contemporary U.S. legal culture, the law is widely seen as an instrument to 
serve ends. Many legal theories construe law in instrumental terms (law is an 
instrument to maximize wealth, law is an instrument of male patriarchy, etc.). 
Law professors indoctrinate students to reason instrumentally using legal rules 
and policy arguments. . . .  Judges increasingly engage in instrumental analysis 
when deciding cases. . . . Legislation and administrative regulations are seen as 
empty vessels that can be filled in and applied to achieve whatever ends might 
be desired.‖ 
 
See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END:  THREAT TO THE 
RULE OF LAW (2006). 
 
6 This Article does not enter the ancient debate about whether in some extreme 
circumstances – to avoid some severe harm – lying may be justified.  (None of the 
instances of mendacity here considered involved harm avoidance of that sort.).  Relevant 
authorities on this debate may be accessed through Christopher Tollefsen, Intending 
Damage to Basic Goods, 14 CHRISTIAN BIOETHICS  272 (2008). 
     
7 John Paul II, ―Instrumentum Laboris for the Synod  of Bishops -- Second Special 
Assembly for  Europe,‖ in L’Osservatore Romano, Weekly Edition in English,  November 
18,  1999.  See John Paul II, ―Message to Prof.  Sergio Zaninalli, Rector  Magnificent of 
the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart,‖ May 24, 2000, in L’Osservatore Romano,  
Weekly Edition in English,  May 24, 2000 at 9 (―The value of  solidarity is in crisis.).   
8  FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE GREAT DISRUPTION:  HUMAN NATURE AND THE 
RECONSTITUTION OF SOCIAL ORDER 5-6 (1999). 
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          French sociologists identify a syndrome they call ―Bovarysm‖ (after Emma 
in Madame Bovary):  ―the tendency to see oneself as other than one is, and to bend 
one‘s vision of other persons and things to suit this willed metamorphosis.‖9      
Jung Chang in her book Wild Swans:  Three Daughters of China, described the 
Great Leap Forward period as having been ―a time when telling fantasies to 
oneself as well as others, and believing them, was practiced to an incredible 
degree.‖  
 
―Peasants moved crops from several plots of land to one plot to show 
party officials that they had produced a miracle harvest.  * * * Although 
these crops generally died within a few days because of untimely 
transportation and harmful density, the visitors did not know that, or 
did not want to know. A large part of the population was swept into this 
confused, crazy world.  ‗Self-deception while deceiving others‘ . . . . 
gripped the nation. Many people – including agricultural scientists and 
senior Party leaders – said they saw the miracles themselves.  Those who 
failed to match other peoples‘ fantastic claims began to doubt and blame 
themselves.   * * *   [T]hey were now facing a nationwide tidal wave of 
fervor which promised to swamp any individual coolheadedness.  It was 
easy to start ignoring reality and simply put one‘s faith in Mao.  To go 
along with the frenzy was by far the easiest course.  * * *   
 
     ―Trucks used to turn up at our compound carrying grinning peasants 
coming in to report on some fantastic, record-breaking achievement.  
One day it was a monster cucumber half as long as the truck. Another 
time it was a tomato carried with difficulty by two children. ―10     
 
          What may induce such delusionary episodes?  In some instances, the 
answer must be envy and shame.  Like Emma Bovary,  chafing under the tedious 
routines of daily life, some people imagine themselves to be exiled members of 
an elegant aristocracy.   Like the Haitian elite (according to one of Haiti‘s  leading 
writers), some subjugated peoples succumb to a ―Bovarysme collectif” which leads 
                                               
9 Deborah Jenson,  ―Bovarysm and Exoticism,‖ in COLUMBIA HISTORY OF 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY FRENCH THOUGHT 167 (Lawrence D. Kristman & Brian J. 




(accessed July 28, 2008).   
 




them to live, speak, and think as though they inhabited the cultural world of the  
foreign colonizer.11  
 
        In other instances, the disorder may arise from a kind of stupidity.  Like 
many weak-minded individuals in all ages, some people – not a few in our own 
era -- suffer from blurriness of vision and flaccidity of judgment.  They exhibit  
an inability to discern the world clearly and an unwillingness to credit the 
fundamental associations of human society with significant rootedness or 
traction.  All things appear – all things are judged to be – trivial and transient.  
Reflecting his experiences with Nazism, the Austrian writer Heimito von 
Doderer observes: 
 
―That man becomes a revolutionary . . . who from the beginning  
perceives realities too vaguely because of his own poor eyesight.  For 
that reason realities lead in his mind the wretched, degenerate, 
unsubstantial existence of trivial facts.   Thus none of them are for him 
definitive, none are unchangeable, none cannot be removed from their 
place, none are the expressions of permanent laws . . . .‖12  
 
In such a person‘s mind, even the most basic political and familial affiliations are 
trivialized or instrumentalized.  True friendship, authentic political loyalties, and 
sound family structures require understanding and good judgment.  For afflicted 
persons, ―all such normalities are parched and dead within them.‖13  They 
substitute a delusionary universe for the real one in which they have lost their 
footing.  They establish, in the place which could have been occupied with 
marriage, friendship, and other solidarities, a set of alliances for the propagation 
of delusion.14  
 
       In some instances, delusionary thinking may be the wages of pride; of an 
impatience with the ambiguities of a complex world and an unwillingness to 
abide its uncertainties; of a longing to become the author rather than a mere 
                                               
11 Haiti, or the Haitian elite, is described this way in   PRICE-MARS, AINSI PARLA 
L‘ONCLE (1928) (SO SPOKE THE UNCLE )(Magdaline W. Shannon, trans., 1983).   
 
12 I HEIMITO VON DODERER, THE DEMONS 493 (Richard & Clara Winston, trans., 
1961)(a translation of DIE DÄMONEN (1956)). (These statements, and others quoted in 
this Article, are made by one of the characters in this novel.).   
 
13
  Id. at 492.  
 
14




reader of the book of life.  Some people desire to dominate phenomena rather 
than quietly to await their unfolding.  Some, as Eric Voegelin observed, ―lust for 
massively possessive experience.‖  Unwilling to remain in a state of wonder -- 
―trembling on the verge of a certainty‖15 -- they flee ―from uncertain truth into 
certain untruth.‖16   
 
        In some people‘s minds, an ―exuberance of the ego‖ projects experiential 
phenomena into a dominant position.17   Manifestations of external realia become 
obscured, in their consciousness, by projections of their own attitudes and 
feelings.   Social institutions, affiliations, and moral determinations  come to be 
perceived as epiphenomena of phobias and attractions and other such affective 
conditions.   
 
       Such delusionary projects take on a special virulence when they involve  
perception and thought about the person himself.  (We might call such a 
condition that of ―reflexive delusion.‖).   Bovarysm involves reflexive delusion 
(imagining oneself to be an aristocrat or a Haitian French colonizer).  Stupidity 
usually induces reflexive ignorance and often reflexive delusion, since accurate 
and realistic self-knowledge demands a considerable degree of intelligence.  
Pride distorts self-understanding, promoting a perfected self-image.   
 
                                               
15 ERIC VOEGELIN, THE NEW SCIENCE OF POLITICS 122  (1952): 
 
―The life of the soul in openness toward God, the waiting, the periods of aridity 
and dullness, guilt and despondency, contrition and repentance, forsakenness 
and hope against hope, the silent stirrings of love and grace, trembling on the 
verge of a certainty which if gained is loss — the very lightness of this fabric 
may prove too heavy a burden for men who lust for massively possessive 
experience.‖ 
 
(Voegelin is here writing about wonder and certainty about religious matters.). 
16
 ERIC VOEGELIN, SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND GNOSTICISM 83 (2004). 
17
 Cf. ERIC VOEGELIN, AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL REFLECTIONS 94 (rev. ed.  Ellis 
Sandoz, ed., 2006) (volume 34 of THE  COLLECTED WORKS OF ERIC VOEGELIN)  
(―[I]n recent years [I have] developed the concept of the egophanic revolt, in order to 
designate the concentration on the epiphany of the ego as the fundamental experience that 
eclipses the epiphany of God in the structure of Classic and Christian consciousness.  * * 
*  The term egophanic revolt, [distinguishes the] experience of the exuberant ego from 
the experience of the theophanic constitution of humanity . . . .‖).  
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        Delusions may always be difficult to sustain; but this is especially so in the 
case of reflexive delusion.  The true self is always close at hand, shadowing the 
delusion.   The reflexive delusionist is vulnerable to disquiet and shame.  
 
         Some embittered characters storm out of the real world in a rage born of  
self-hatred and resentment.  Adolph Hitler ―deliberately chose to whip himself 
into a state of histrionic anger until he was quite willing to believe what he also 
knew to be false.‖18    Von Doderer observes that a revolutionary is ―someone 
who wants to change the general situation because of the impossibility or 
untenability of his own position,‖ or rather someone who wishes, for such 
reasons, to alter ―the fundamentals of life in general.‖19   
 
―A person who has been unable to endure himself becomes a 
revolutionary; then it is others who have to endure him.  The abandoned, 
highly concrete task of his own life, with which he has been unable to 
cope in a personal and individual fashion, has of course to be consigned 
to oblivion, and along with it the capacity for remembering in general  . . 
. . ‖20 
 
These are episodes, not of simple ignorance, but of a ―deliberate desire not to 
understand.‖21     
 
        An entire regime may descend down similar paths, promulgating a false 
version of history, a distorted system of political morality, and a falsifiedly heroic 
account of its own origins, ascent to power, and conduct in office. It may ―carr[y] 
out a systematic falsification of history,‖22  going so far as to  construct  a ―second 
                                               
18 BARRY COOPER, NEW POLITICAL RELIGIONS, OR AN ANALYSIS OF MODERN 
TERRORISM  44 (2005), citing ERIC VOEGELIN, HITLER AND THE GERMANS 150-51 
(2003).   
 
19
 I HEIMITO VON DODERER, THE DEMONS 491 (Richard & Clara Winston, trans., 
1961).   
 
20 Id.  
 
21 ERIC VOEGELIN, HITLER AND THE GERMANS 255 (2003)(characterizing the views 
of von Doderer). 
 
22 Id. (characterizing the views of von Doderer). Compare KATHERINE  VERDERY, 
NATIONAL IDEOLOGY UNDER SOCIALISM:  IDENTITY AND CULTURAL 
POLITICS IN CEAUSESCU‘S ROMANIA 167-214 (1991) (describing ―protochronism,‖ 
the widespread assertion that  major accomplishments in European society and culture 
were first achieved by Romanians.).   
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reality.‖23    Von Doderer referred to the creation of  ―pseudological spaces‖ – 
―completely false, but comprehensible and all encompassing images of life.‖24 
 
          Systematic political mendacity tends to discredit the thoughtful man and 
celebrate the brutish or the self-indulgent.25 It leads on, even, to the devaluation 
of the virtues of thoughtfulness, such as circumspection and deliberation in 
arriving at conclusions and clarity and precision in formulating them.  It may 
propose that such virtues are unnecessary and lead only to weakness and 
confusion; that the life of the mind as it ought to be lived involves the energetic 
propagation of a limited number of simple concepts and insights, endorsed more 
for their salutary emotional and political effects than for any philosophical 
merits.  (We might call this sort of thing ―epistemological mendacity,‖ since it 
involves the distortion not only of conclusions but also of the procedures for 
reaching them.).  Some officials during the Nazi regime seemed almost to 
organize the activities of the mind as aspects of military training or even as 
excercises in calisthenics.26     
 
       (Some contemporary writers, in a very different vein, seem to understand the 
life of the mind as an epiphenomenon of the emotions.  This extensive cultural 
phenomenon is reflected in the migration of vocabulary, in which some words, 
such as ―happiness,‖ ―love‖ and ―prejudice,‖ today seem to refer almost entirely 
to experiential states rather than to objective conditions.  The phenomenon is 
                                               
23  ERIC VOEGELIN, HITLER AND THE GERMANS 255 (2003)(characterizing the views 
of von Doderer.).   
 
24 As  quoted in DAVID S. LUFT, EROS AND INWARDNESS IN VIENNA:  
WEININGER, MUSIL, DODERER (2003).  
 
25 See II ADOLPH HITLER, MEIN KAMPF chapter 2 passim (1926), deploring the 
practice of schools‘ ―cramming‖ knowledge into students, and commending instead 
programs of thorough physical training and the development of  character traits such as 
the ability to withstand ―pain and injury.‖  
 
26
 See SANFORD L. SEGAL, MATHEMATICIANS UNDER THE NAZIS 219 (2003), quoting 
Gerhard Thomsen, ―Über die Gefahr der Zurückdrāngung der Exakten Naturwissenschaften an 
der Schulen und Hochschulen,‖Neue Jahrbū cher fūrWissenschaft und Jugenbildung 164, 169 
(1934):  
 
―I consider that one of the most important tasks of National Socialist education of the 
people is training intellectual (geistiger) concentration and one should begin with this, 
naturally besides physical education . . . . * * * [H]e who does not have intellectual 
concentration must be educated thereto with the same reckless and almost brutal energy 
with which today‘s German will be educated to other things which lie in the interest of 
the fatherland.‖  
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reflected, also, in the acceptance or rejection of arguments in philosophical 
discourse based on  how they make people feel.  As with the objection that a line 
of argument is ―offensive.‖). 
 
       Systematic political mendacity often involves the distortion of language.   
George Orwell in Nineteen Eighty-Four27described a regime which went so far as 
to propound a new version of English, with a different vocabulary and a 
simplified syntax designed to render critical discourse difficult or even 
impossible (and thence, to vitiate critical thought itself).  Something like this 
occurred during the Chinese Cultural Revolution : 
 
   ―The whole nation slid into doublespeak.  Words became divorced 
from reality, responsibility, and people‘s real thoughts.  Lies were told 
with ease because words had lost their meanings – and had ceased to be 
taken seriously by others.‖28 
 
        There is no reason to suppose that such developments ensue only in the 
aftermath of revolutions.   Bovarysm, restless discontent, the parching of basic 
human relationships, desire for certainty, hunger for domination, and 
deterioration of self-esteem may afflict established authorities as well as 
insurgent ones.  Even political orders of long standing may experience  --  
perhaps even for extended periods of time -- diminution of clarity of thought, 
loss of conceptual traction, and descent into states of mental disengagement, 
slipping into an unquiet dreaminess which dims discernment and occludes 
firmness of judgment.29 
 
  
                                               
27 (1949) (Random House ed., 1992).   
 
28 JUNG CHANG, WILD SWANS:  THREE DAUGHTERS OF CHINA  225 (1991).    For 
an account of Mao‘s suppression of irony, see section III B of this Article. 
 
29
 For discussions of such developments as social (not specifically political) phenomena, 
see Scott FitzGibbon, The Seduction of Lydia Bennet and the Jurisprudence of the 
Juristic Society, in FAMILY LAW:  BALANCING INTERESTS AND PURSUING 
PRIORITIES 64 (Lynn D. Wardle & Camille S. Williams, eds., 2007); Scott FitzGibbon, 
A City Without Duty, Fault or Shame, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY:  CRITICAL 
REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY 
DISSOLUTION (Robin Fretwell Wilson, ed., Cambridge University Press, 2006).  
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B.   Disrespect:   Some  Reflections.  
 
         The horrors of the Twentieth Century were marked by systematic episodes 
of intense disrespect.  Bovarysm  finds its roots in a disrespect for things as they 
actually are and a disdain for ordinary people, established conventions, and the 
regularities of every day life.  Emma Bovary disrespected her husband.30  
Flaubert displayed through her and her surroundings his comprehensive 
contempt for the world in general.31     
 
         Revolutionary contempt for ―bourgeois society‖ is well known, and has 
often extended to an attitude of derogation towards almost all customary 
attitudes and conventional practices.   Arrogance and disgust were recurrent 
features of Nazi ―skinhead‖ culture.  Their smell permeated Hitler‘s speeches, 
which exuded contempt not only for Jews and other obvious enemies but also for 
a remarkable range of other targets:  social democrats, slavs,32 and artists who 
painted meadows blue and skies yellow.33    The Maoist leadership  encouraged, 
and the Red Guards implemented, a policy of contempt for those things which 
had once been most respected in China:   ―the four olds‖:   ―old concepts, culture, 
                                               
30 Thus, she thinks:   
 
―Charles‘s conversation was as flat as any pavement, and everybody‘s ideas 
plodded along it, garbed in pedestrian style, inspiring no emotion, no laughter, 
no reverie. . . . He did not know how to swim, or fence, or shoot a gun, and he 
was unable, one day, to explain to her a term in riding that she had come across 
in a book.  But a man, surely, should know everything . . . . ‖. 
 
GUSTAVE FLAUBERT, MADAME BOVARY 38 (Margaret Mauldon trans. , 2004).  
31
 See STEPHEN HEATH, GUSTAVE FLAUBERT, MADAME BOVARY 30 (1999): 
  ―Flaubert‘s constant words during the writing of Madame Bovary are ‗stupid,‘ 
‗fetid‘ – ‗the foulness makes me sick‘ – which apply both to the subject of the 
book he is writing and to the world around him, these being one and the same; 
one bourgeois reality from world to book and back again.‖ 
 
32 See Gerhard Masur, Vienna and the Young Hitler, 329 ANNALS  AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCIENCE 172 (1960). 
 
33 GEORGE LACHMAN MOSSE, NAZI CULTURE:  INTELLECTUAL, CULTURAL 
AND SOCIAL LIFE IN THE THIRD REICH 15 (2003)(Hitler: ‖there really are men who 
on principle feel meadows to be blue, the heaven green, clouds sulphur-yellow.‖).   
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customs, and habits.‖34  Even old working-class practices were attacked.35  
Respectful customs, such as saying ―thank you,‖ came in for criticism.36  Some 
attest that Russian communist leadership was contemptuous even of the 
workers.  In the novel Nineteen Eighty-Four, the regime disrespects love itself and 
other normal human sentiments.  (‗The terrible thing that the Party had done was 
to persuade you that . . . mere feelings, were of no account . . . .‖)37 and some of 
its apparatchiks despise even the proletariat.  (One of Winston‘s colleagues in the 
Ministry of Truth states: ―the proles are not human beings.‖).38  Marxist theorists 
have proposed that ―any society which needs the concept of respect is 
fundamentally defective.‖39    
 
       Modern Western societies seldom manifest comprehensive 
contemptuousness of the sorts described above, but they may sometimes neglect 
to ground respect securely on well considered understandings of merit; and they 
                                               
34 XIOABANG LI, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN CHINESE ARMY 232 (2007)(at a 
mass meeting in 1966, Lin Biao ―exhorted the Red Guards to ‗smash‘ the Four Olds:  ‗the 
old concepts, culture, customs, and habits of the exploiting classes.‘‖).   
 
35  Socializing at a tea-house, for example.  See JUNG CHANG, WILD SWANS:  THREE 
DAUGHTERS OF CHINA  289-91 (1991).   
 
36 See id. at 290:  
 
―I had been brought up to be courteous and respectful to anyone older than I, 
but now to be revolutionary meant being aggressive and militant.  Gentleness 
was considered ‗bourgeois.‘  I was repeatedly criticized for it . . . . Over the 
years of the Cultural Revolution, I was to witness people being attacked for 
saying ‗thank you‘ too often . . . ; courtesy was on the brink of extinction.‖ 
 
37 At 172  (Random House ed., 1992).  The next sentence reads:  ―When once you were in 
the grip of the Party, what you felt or did not feel, what you did or refrained from doing, 
made literally no difference.‖  
 
38 Id. at 56. 
 
39 ALLEN E. BUCHANAN, MARX AND JUSTICE:  THE RADICAL CRITIQUE OF 
LIBERALISM  77 (1982)(―If, as Marx seems to believe, the concept of right plays a 
significant role in social organization only in societies that have failed to control and 
minimize competition, scarcity, interpersonal conflict, and the separation of man from 
man, and if having the concept of respect entails having the concept of persons as right-
bearers, then it follows that any society which needs the concept of respect is 
fundamentally defective.‖).  Buchanan  contests this conclusion. 
 
 12 
do hesitate to confer especially high levels of respect in recognition of special 
excellences.  They are regimes of ―respect lite.‖  A British commentator laments: 
 
―[I]n the past to have a good name and a good character were both 
necessary and sufficient for self-esteem and for gaining the respect of 
others. . . . This kind of respect was available to everyone, but it had to be 
earned.  Respect was not the cheap and impudent demand of today for 
automatic acceptance regardless of qualities of character or patterns of 
behavior.‖40   
 
John Rawls, in A Theory of Justice, recommended a practice which he termed 
―democracy in judging each other‘s aims.‖  Out of solicitude for the self-esteem 
of all,41 he recommended that ―as citizens we  . . . avoid any assessment of the 
relative value of one another‘s way of life.‖42  
 
C.  The Syndromes of Mendacity and Disrespect; Veracity and Respect:   
Some Reflections. 
 
        Mendacity and disrespect often seem to go together, and it is easy to surmise 
some reasons why they may.  To tell someone a lie is also usually to disrespect 
him, as acts of a harmful nature often are, by implying that he does not deserve 
the level of decent treatment to which most people are entitled.  To speak 
disrespectfully often also involves mendacity.  It is, if intended literally, a lie to 
call someone a dog or to say that he is not fully human.   
                                               
40 CHRISTIE DAVIES, THE STRANGE DEATH OF MORAL BRITAIN 43 (2004). 
 
41 Page 440 (1972)(self-esteem is ―perhaps the most important primary good.‖).  
 
42 Id. at 442 (1972): 
 
―[a]s citizens we are to reject the standard of perfection as a political principle, 
and for the purposes of justice avoid any assessment of the relative value of one 
another‘s way of life. . . . Thus what is necessary is that there should be for each 
person at least one community of shared interests to which he belongs and 
where he finds his endeavors confirmed by his associates.  And for the most 
part this assurance is sufficient whenever in public life citizens respect one 
another‘s ends and adjudicate their political claims in ways that also support 
their self-esteem.‖   
 
       It can be but a very thin confirmation or ―assurance‖ which is not founded on 
an assessment of merit.  If you avoid making any judgments as to the value of what 
a person  does or who he is, anything you are likely to say  to ―support [his] self-




         More fundamentally, the comprehensive flight from reality involved in 
systematic mendacity places the fugitive fantasist in a position of apprehension 
and adversity with regards to anyone who might be inclined to let daylight into 
his cave.  During the Cultural Revolution, those who expressed skepticism about 
monster cucumbers and the like were attacked and humiliated.43  
Comprehensive ―epistemological mendacity‖:  the flight from logic and reason – 
gives the delusionist reason to dislike and extrude practitioners of modes of 
thought he has rejected; or to devalue and distort their activities (characterizing 
teaching as  ―cramming‖ knowledge into students44 and engaging in ―intellectual 
acrobatics,‖45 for example).      
 
       Contrariwise, the endorsement of contemptuous conclusions about wide 
sectors of humanity and its institutions cannot be sustained, in a world which 
has much good as well as much evil about it, without a departure from fair-
minded consideration of reality.    Comprehensive contempt for man entails 
contempt for his intellect, and a propensity to discredit philosophical 
conclusions. 
       
         Quite the reverse can be observed about veracity and respect, which 
reinforce one another along lines similar to those along which mendacity and 
disrespect interact.  Telling someone the truth, especially the truth one would 
rather conceal, acknowledges his entitlement to honorable treatment.  Treating 
someone with respect -- respectfully acknowledging his merits – is a project best 
founded upon an honest appraisal and a truthful account of what his merits 
really are.   A political regime which founds its claims to loyalty and support on 
a truthful account of real merit  will flourish by promoting practices of reason 





                                               
43 JUNG CHANG, WILD SWANS:  THREE DAUGHTERS OF CHINA  224 
(1991)(―people who refused to boast of massive increases in output were beaten up until 
they gave in.‖). 
   
44  II ADOLPH HITLER, MEIN KAMPF chapter 2 passim (1926), deploring the practice of 
schools‘ ―cramming‖ knowledge into students. 
 
45 WILLIAM SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THID REICH:   A HISTORY OF 
NAZI GERMANY  248 (1990 ed.)(quoting the regime‘s Prussian Minister of Science, Art 
and Education as boasting that he had ―succeeded overnight in ‗liquidating the school as 
an institution of intellectual acrobatics[‗‖). 
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D.  Veracity and Respect by the Law:  Some Reflections. 
  
          A successful stand for the practices of veracity and respect may be taken at 
the bar of justice and in the witness boxes, counsel tables, and judicial benches of 
courts of law.     
 
           The trial, for example -- because of its dramatic social profile and 
authoritative status; because of its insulation from the marketplace  and the 
political hustings; because of the care and caution induced by the weighty 
matters of life and fortune which balance in its scales; because of its rules of 
evidence and its practices of cross examination and debate; because of its 
openness to scrutiny;  because of its amenability to correction through judicial 
review -- the courtroom trial is for these reasons especially well qualified to 
unmask mendacity and to sustain practices of veracity.  By affording to everyone 
his ―day in court‖:  his right to testify, to be represented by counsel, and to cross-
examine opposition witnesses – the trial manifests respect.    
 
         Similar points apply to the proceedings of appellate courts and legislatures.  
The patience and care invested in common-law appellate judging and the 
precision which is frequently devoted to statutory drafting are exercises in 
veracity and conduce to practices of respect.  The pursuit of coherence and 
consistency, year in and year out, case by case, is a notable exemplar to the entire 
community of how practices of reason may be conducted and veracity ensured.  
Altogether, the law is well positioned to tether the social and political worlds to 
the stanchions of objective reality and the practices of honor and respect, and to 
shine a strong beam of light on structures of pseudological obscurity. 
 
            Regrettably, the law itself occasionally suffers disorders of thought and 
reason.  Those who speak for the law may be vulnerable to the suasions of ethical 
skepticism, relativism or nihilism46 and so lose their sense of the ―weight‖ of 
                                               
46 See generally  MOHAMMAD A. SHOMALI, ETHICAL RELATIVISM:  AN ANALYSIS 
OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF MORALITY (2001);  MICHAEL PHILIPS, BETWEEN 
UNIVERSALISM AND SKEPTICISM:  ETHICS AS SOCIAL ARTIFACT (1994);  
RELATIVISM:  COGNITIVE AND MORAL (Jack W. Meiland & Michael Krausz, eds., 
1982).    
 
     H.L.A. Hart -- the most influential jurisprudence scholar in  the English-speaking 
world for the past forty years -- was an ethical skeptic.   See H.L.A. Hart, ―Who Can Tell 
Right from Wrong?,‖ N. Y. REV, BOOKS (July 17, 1986), available at 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/5056 (accessed July 2, 2008)(―unless I am already 
committed to the motivations of an impartial morality, reflective deliberation will not 
lead me to it.‖ ).  See John Finnis, Hart’s Ways:  Law as Reason and as Fact, 52 AM. J. JURIS. 
25, 50-51 (2007)(―Was the moral scepticism to which Hart gives restrained but clear voice 
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―life‘s normal relationships‖ (―all such normalities are parched and dead within 
them‖).47  They may come to surmise that  major legal principles –- principles of 
freedom for example,48 or justice,49 or equality – protect no objective goods.  They 
may come to apprehend that words have no set correspondences, that 
propositions convey no objective meanings, and that rules and principles are 
infinitely malleable. They may accept the doctrines of positivism, which 
proposes that things are only what people make of them; that human 
associations are creations of fiat; and that juristic status is independent of 
requirements of ethics.  Although a skeptic need not be a Bovaryst, nor a stupid 
nor an arrogant person, his theory if consistently extended leads along similar 
paths.  If his views are correct, all speech depicts pseudological space and the law 
itself is a pseudological world.    
 
          Skepticism vitiates practices of legal veracity. Legal principles which 
demand the vigilant pursuit of truth lose their traction where truth is surmised to 
be illusory.  Rules of evidence and other rules of legal procedure – the 
―epistemological morality of the law‖ – deteriorate where their obvious purpose 
– getting at the truth – is suspect.  The virtues surrounding and supporting 
veracity, such as candor as to the basis for a conclusion and lucidity in defining 
and expressing it, stand to suffer a similar deterioration.  (One understandably 
has mixed feelings – mixed motives – when called upon to depict the shaky 
structure underlying an important conclusion; and it is difficult steadily to focus 
upon a mirage.).   
 
       Skepticism compromises a legal system‘s ability or willingness to speak with 
common sense and in commonly understandable English.   Ordinary language 
                                                                                                                                            
in his last work a change of direction for him, something extrinsic to the architecture of 
his main work in the philosophy of law? I feel sure it was not.―). 
 
47 I HEIMITO VON DODERER, THE DEMONS 493 (Richard & Clara Winston, trans., 1961).    
 
48
 See, e.g., Executive Board, American Anthropological Association, Statement on Human 
Rights, 49 AM.  ANTHROPOLOGIST 539, 542 (1947)(available on jstor),  reprinted in 
MORTON E. WINSTON, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 116, 119 
(1989)(―Standards and values are relative to the culture from which they derive.‖;  ―the eternal 
verities only seem so because we have been taught to regard them as such . . . .‖  ―man is free 
only when he lives as his society defines freedom . . . his rights are those he recognizes as a 
member of his society . . . . ‖).  
 
49
 HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 48-49 (Anders Wedberg, 
trans., 2007)(―Something is just or unjust only for an individual for whom the appropriate norm 
of justice exists, and this norm exists only for those who, for some reason or other, wish what the 
norm prescribes.  * * *   [T]he norm of justice . . . is ultimately an expression of the interest of the 
individual who pronounces a social institution to be just or unjust.‖). 
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and discourse is grounded in common-sense appreciation of good and bad and 
right and wrong.  It sounds that way and ―feels‖ that way.  Modern legal 
theorists of a skeptical bent – and, increasingly, common-law judges of an 
academic influence -- develop specialized, difficult, and self-involved systems of 
speaking and thinking.   They are drawn to specialized definitions which diverge 
from common understandings.  
 
       Skepticism may diminish practices of respect.   This will occur where familiar 
paradigms of virtuous or villainous conduct are debunked.  Practices of respect 
are most appropriately responses to merit.50  Where standards of merit are 
thought to be idiosyncratic, practices of merit-based respect will lose their 
traction.   Where standards of merit are thought to be arbitrary, respect may be 
understood as a reflex of feeling or an acknowledgement of threat.   
 
 
II.  DEFINITIONS. 
 
A.   Veracity.  
 
          Veracity consists of  the practice of telling the truth and of  the character 
traits which lead a person to truthfulness.  Mendacity is its opposite. 
 
          The virtues of veracity are fully exercised when a speaker attends to a 
matter, attains insight into it, and faithfully communicates his true 
understanding to another person, seeking to induce the hearer to consider what 
the speaker is trying to communicate and to accept as true the speaker‘s 
expressed understanding.51  At a fundamental level, veracity entails a disposition 
to credit that there is such a thing as truth:  a rejection, in other words, of 
epistemological skepticism.  Veracity includes a willingness and capacity to 
discern the truth and to report it faithfully.  Veracity involves – and especially so 
in complex matters, within a lengthy exchange of communications  -- the ability 
and commitment to practices of clarity, coherence, and consistency.   It extends to 
the promotion of a dialectic in which both sides seek the truth and cooperate in 
understanding, formulating, and  communicating it. 
 
                                               
50 See the definition below at II B. 
 
51
 Another element might be added:  it might be said that the speaker invites the hearer to believe 
because of trust in the speaker.  Cf. Paul Faulkner, What Is Wrong with Lying?, 75 PHIL. & 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 524 (2007), which develops the insight that lying is bad because, 
among other reasons, it  involves inviting trust,and then betraying it.  
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         The vices of mendacity are indulged when the speaker fails to exercise the 
virtues of veracity.  At a fundamental level, mendacity may arise from a 
contemptuous disregard for the possibility that there are any basic truths, or any 
which relate to the matter under discussion, or any that need guide the 
mendacious person‘s speech.  Less drastically, the vices of mendacity operate 
when a speaker slides into uncaring imprecision of expression and slippery, 
unstable practices of definition.52  Degeneracy of speech is in some cases a form 
of mendacity.   
 
       The vices of mendacity flourish in a political regime whose officials‘ 
perception of the truth is distorted by fear or by a shamed aversion to their own 
characters or to their regime‘s history and intentions. They flourish in a regime, 
like that in Orwell‘s Nineteen Eighty-Four, where officials, or some of them, hardly 
attempt any longer critically to consider whether what they say is true.53   They 
flourish in those instances where officials no longer expect to be fully believed 
(as may have been the situation in some Eastern European countries in the latter 
stages of communism).  Projects of confabulation involve mendacity.54  
                                               
52 Thus mendacity as here understood is broader than lying, as that term is defined in 
many authorities which define lying to exclude negligent or ignorant false speech.  E.g. 
BERNARD WILLIAMS, TRUTH AND TRUTHFULNESS:  AN ESSAY IN GENEALOGY 
96 (2002)(―I take a lie to be an assertion, the content of which the speaker believes to be 
false, which is made with the intention to deceive the hearer with respect to that 
content.‖); SISSELA BOK, LYING:  MORAL CHOICES IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE  
15 (2d ed. 1999)(a lie is ―an intentionally deceptive message in the form of a statement.‖); 
J.E. Mason, A Definition of Deceiving, 21 INTERN, J. APPLIED PHIL. 181 (2007). See 
Arnold Isenberg, Deontology and the Ethics of Lying, in AESTHETICS AND THE THEORY 
OF CRITICISM:  SELECTED ESSAYS OF ARNOLD ISENBERG 245, 249 (William 
Callaghan, Leigh Cauman & Carl G. Hempel, eds., 1988)(―A mistaken utterance is not as 
such a lie.‖). 
 
53 At 57 (1949) (Random House ed., 1992):  ―[I]t was not the man‘s brain that was 
speaking, it was his larynx.  The stuff that was coming out of him consisted of words, 
but it was not speech in the true sense; it was a noise uttered in unconsciousness, like the 
quacking of a duck.‖   
54 Is it a lie to make a false statement that you know will not be believed? See Roy 
Sorensen, Bald-Faced Lies!  Lying without the Intent to Deceive, 88 PAC. PHILOSOPHICAL 
Q. 251 (2007), available at http://artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/people/sorensen (accessed 
June 28, 2009)(stating on the first page that ―[t]he wrongness of lying springs from the 
intent to deceive – just the feature missing in the case of bald-faced lies.―). See generally  
J.E. Mason, A Definition of Deceiving, 21 INTERN. J. APPLIED PHIL. 181 
(2007)(―deceiving is necessarily intentional, [requiring] that the deceived person 
acquires or continues to have a false belief.‖).  It helps to divide this problem into two 
categories.  
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    One category includes euphemisms.  Someone who says she was ―powdering her 
nose‖ is not a liar.  The story is told of Arthur Rubinstein‘s servant Francois, who 
informed an untimely telephone caller that the great man was not at home.  ―But I hear 
him playing,‖ the caller protested.  ―You are mistaken, madame,‖ the servant replied.  
―I‘m dusting the piano keys.‖ CLIFTON FADIMAN & ANDRÉ BOULARD, 
BARTLETT‘S BOOK OF ANECDOTES 471 (2000).   See Arnold Isenberg, Deontology and 
the Ethics of Lying, in AESTHETICS AND THE THEORY OF CRITICISM:  SELECTED 
ESSAYS OF ARNOLD ISENBERG 245, 256-57 (William Callaghan, Leigh Cauman & 
Carl G. Hempel, eds., 1988): 
―[T]he words ‗She is not at home,‘ delivered by a servant to a relative at the 
door, have become a mere euphemism for indisposition or disinclination.  Since 
the author of the message knows that the recipient will interpret it as a polite 
way of saying, ‗it is inconvenient for me to see you now,‘ there is no intention 
of making him believe something that she (the author) does not believe . . . [A] 
polite lie is often not a lie at all.‖   
     Many euphemisms are not false statements at all.  In context, they have a clear 
meaning which is in accord with the truth. They may be assigned that meaning by the 
specialized community in which they are used.  (―The batter walked‖ is a true statement 
even if he jogged to first base.).  They may be assigned a special meaning by the 
community as a whole; one which diverges from the meaning that might be inferred by 
parsing it out word by word.  (―Powdering my nose‖ is like that.).  (―Rubinstein is not at 
home‖ is not so clearly assigned a specialized meaning and cannot certainly, at least in 
contemporary American culture, be defended in this way.).  As these comments suggest, 
the defense of a euphemistic ―falsehood‖ depends upon its unambiguously bearing the 
true alternate meaning.    
 
        A second category might be called ―confabulation,‖ and is best illustrated with a 
story.  A young man who lives quite some distance away sneaks into his father-in-law‘s 
chicken coop at five A.M. and emerges, two dead hens in hand, to be apprehended by 
his father-in-law at shotgun point.  He offers as an explanation that he was ―checking 
the coop‖ and frightened away a thief.  Of course the father-in-law does not believe this 
(and the son-in-law knows that he does not).  But the father-in-law accepts the 
explanation for the sake of family peace.  (The story is from  Roy Sorensen , supra, page 
5.).  The statements of the son-in-law cannot be found to have a true specialized 
meaning.  They are undisputably false.   But they are not intended to produce belief 
(quite likely).  They are intended, rather, to invite the father-in-law into the project of 
confabulation:  of acting and speaking as though the statements were true.   
 
               What is the morality of confabulatory statements?  They do not involve one of the 
worst evils of mendacity, namely that of planting false beliefs in the mind of the hearer.  
Neither, however, do they fully participate in the goods of veracity. They close off 
disclosure and dialectics as to the truths of the situation.  (If he is stealing chickens 
because his family is hungry, the father-in-law needs to know that but the son-in-law 
has maneuvered himself into a situation where he is unlikely ever to admit it.).  Such 
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B.  Respect.  
 
       1.  In General. -- Respect involves attending to,  understanding, and crediting 
merit.  The practices of respect include speaking in a way that shows  
attentiveness to merit and acknowledges it.  At a fundamental level, respect 
therefore involves eschewing ethical skepticism; crediting the possibility of 
merit; endorsing a system of merit and demerit; and participating in a system of 
discourse which  acknowledges the good and bad, the impressive and the 
unimpressive, the honorable and dishonorable. 
 
        Disrespect is the corresponding vice, and is exercised most blatantly when 
someone speaks insultingly, denying merit or attributing false demerit.  
(Sometimes, furthermore, attributing actual demerit disrespects, for example 
when it is none of the speaker‘s business.).   Uncaring slovenliness of speech can 
also, in some cases, exhibit disrespect. 
 
          2.  Basic Respect and Special Respect. --  It helps to distinguish two kinds of 
respect.55  One sort – here, ―basic respect‖ – is applicable to anyone.  This is so 
because basic respect consists in attending to, understanding and crediting that 
sort of merit which inheres in simply being human.56  (―Basic disrespect‖ consists 
in denying this sort of merit, or in simply refusing to attend or understand it.  
Calling someone a dog exhibits basic disrespect.).       
                                                                                                                                            
statements embarrass candid discussion about ramifications. (What happens next time?  
How many chickens will the father-in-law tolerate losing; how can he make his limits 
clear within the mendacious structure that has been created?)  Such statements  likely 
lead on to lying to others.  (―Why were you out with your shotgun,  darling?‖)  Many 
extensive projects of political pseudologia proceed through instances of confabulation 
like this one.          
55 Compare STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT:  
MORALITY, RESPECT, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 120 et seq. (2006), proposing the 
categories  ―recognition respect‖ and ―appraisal respect.‖ Recognition respect is to be 
awarded not because of special merit but as ―the fitting response to dignity‖ – dignity 
being defined as the ―authority of an equal:  the standing to make claims and demands 
of one another as equal and free rational agents.‖  Id. at 120-21.  It is ―‘what we owe to 
each other‘ as equal moral persons.‖  Id. at 122.  Appraisal respect, on the other hand, ―is 
esteem that is merited by conduct or character.‖  It is ―moral esteem: approbation for her 
as a moral agent.‖ Id.        
 
56 Compare id. at 122-23 (2006)(Recognition respect ―is no form of esteem at all.  * * * * The 
idea is not that personhood is some kind of admirable quality.‖). Per contra, it is 
admirable; human persons are ―wondrously made‖; and even the worst scoundrels 
possess (―deep down‖ or as latent potentialities, at least)   numerous admirable qualities. 
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       Another sort of respect can be called ―special respect,‖ and involves 
attending to, understanding, and crediting special merits.   The term ―‗special‖ 
does not signal specially large or great.  It is used in the sense involved in the 
term ―specialty.‖  Special respect is lacking when you call a lawyer a doctor or a 
doctor a lawyer.  When, in Brideshead Revisited, his host pretended throughout 
dinner to mistake Charles Ryder for an American (―come and see us again next 
time you ‗cross the herring pond‘‖), he disrespected him.  
 
          Thus, a failure of special respect need not involve derogation.   Special 
respect fails when the person in question is mis-located, even though into a 
category which is just as elevated or even loftier than his proper one.   Respect 
entails attending to and understanding what a person really is; disrespect implies 
not caring enough about the other person to understand his real situation or to 
speak accordingly.57   Failure to respect even in this latter sort of way – ―special 
disrespect‖ – is also deplorable and falls within the criticisms of this Article when 
practiced by a legal official.      
        
        3. Implicit Disrespect? – This Article deplores disrespectful express statements.   
Some might extend the condemnation to statements which are merely implicit.  
Professor Ronald Dworkin, for example, applying his requirement that the law 
manifest ―equal concern and respect,‖ would oppose  the government‘s adopting 
any legal restraint ―in virtue of an argument‖ which  undermines a citizen‘s 
―sense of equal worth.‖58   Even an unstated argument would count;  the 
unacceptable premise may be inferred.59   
                                               
57 Should the definition be extended to include attending to and understanding 
characteristics which do not amount to merit?  On the one hand, it does not seem to be 
disrespectful to call a thief an honest man; and an attitude of oblivious disregard for 
another person‘s gaffes or the disreputable episodes in his past may actually be a way to 
show respect for him.  On the other hand, omitting to take the trouble to spell or 
pronounce someone‘s name correctly may be disrespectful.  It seems that we can explain 
the disrespectful character of this latter sort of behavior without greatly expanding the 
definition, if we note that most people regard it as a component of an honorable position 
in society that people know their names and pronounce them correctly, and they regard 
honorable position  as meritorious.  The definition might thus be extended  by allowing 
that respect entails understanding, attending to, and acknowledging those attributes 
which the other party regards as meritorious.  
       
58 A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 205-206 (1985).  Here is a fuller excerpt:   
 
 ―[T]he government . . . must impose no sacrifice or constraint on a person in 
virtue of an argument that the citizen cannot accept without abandoning his 
sense of equal worth.  . . . [N]o self-respecting person who believes that a 
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       Implicit speech is usually problematic.  One reason for this is that the 
implication will usually be ambiguous. Consider, for example, laws prohibiting 
pornography.  Professor Dworkin observes that such prohibitions  are (―likely‖) 
based on ―the hypothesis that the attitudes about sex displayed are demeaning or 
bestial‖ and concludes that such prohibitions are usually objectionable  (―even 
though this hypothesis may be true‖).60  But then, as Dworkin concedes, some 
prohibitions might instead be based on the conclusion that pornography causes 
crime or absenteeism from work.61  What of a prohibition which is based more on 
the latter sort of conclusion than the former?  Does the Dworkinian principle 
condemn a prohibition where some of the implicit conclusions are damaging to 
the sense of self-worth but others are not?  What of a legislative prohibition 
which is based entirely on concerns of the latter sort:  might the legislation fall 
under the Dworkinian condemnation where someone might inaccurately infer 
the insulting implication rather than the actual one?62        
                                                                                                                                            
particular way to live is most valuable for him can accept that this way of life is 
base or degrading.‖  
 
59 Note  the reference to the ―apparent or plausible‖ justification in the passage quoted in 
the next footnote. 
 
60 Id. at 354.   Here is a fuller excerpt: 
 
―People have the right not to suffer disadvantage in the distribution of social 
goods and opportunities . . . just on the grounds that their officials or fellow-
citizens think that their opinions about the right way for them to lead their own 
lives are ignoble or wrong. * * *  
   * * * 
   ―[The government] violates the right . . . when the only apparent or plausible 
justification for a scheme of regulation of pornography  includes the hypothesis 
that the attitudes about sex displayed or nurtured in pornography are 
demeaning or bestial or otherwise unsuitable to human beings of the best sort, 
even though this hypothesis may be true.‖      
 
Id. at 353-54. 
 
61  Dworkin says this is ―only academic speculation‖ because there has not yet been 
established ―a sufficiently direct connection.‖ Id. at 355. 
 
62 Further questions arise if we hypothesize another legislative motive:  one of concern 
for the young models who might be put on pornographic display.  Would the protective 
statute escape the Dworkinian condemnation? Not necessarily:  the viewers‘ sense of 
self-worth might be undermined by the shame of surmising that their legislature 
regarded them as lascivious persons whose viewing habits damaged the young.  Might a 
Dworkinian respond that the viewers‘ sense of self-worth in this matter is inappropriate 
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        As these questions suggest, the Dworkinian approach, and likely any which 
is based on a condemnation of implict statements, lead on to difficult questions 
which elude clear answers.  The present Article sticks to explicit statements.    
 
      
III.  THE GOODS OF VERACITY AND RESPECT BY THE LAW. 
 
         To exercise the virtue of veracity and to treat others with respect is to 
participate in basic goods; and especially so in the case of the law and those who 
speak for it.  This section proposes several ways in which this is the case.    
  
 A.  General Effects on the Hearer.   
 
       Veracity and respect are beneficial to the hearer in obvious instrumental 
ways.  True speech facilitates the practical projects of life.  Respectful speech 
supports good reputation and high self-regard, both of which are helpful if one is 
to secure cooperation and to sustain sufficient morale to carry on.63    
 
         Veracity and respect promote thought and reason –  worthwhile activities in 
themselves, as Aristotle teaches, apart from their serviceability in practical 
affairs.64  The truthful speaker may propose wise insights, formulate and 
                                                                                                                                            
and disproportional because it had been inflated by sadistic arrogance?  Has the 
Dworkinian test room to allow for considerations of what sorts of self-approbation are 
appropriate and in what quantity?   Alternatively, might a Dworkinian defend the law 
based on solicitude for the sense of self-worth  of the models? Does the Dworkinian test 
permit us to weigh the one impact against the other; might it even invite to a 
consideration of all the persons who might think about the law and all the inferences 
that they might draw, giving weight to each persons‘ increment to self-worth and each 
person‘s detriment?   
 
        63 See generally,  JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 440-42 (1971): 
 
―[U]nless our endeavors are appreciated by our associates it is impossible for us 
to maintain the conviction that they are worthwhile…. * * * [T]he conditions for 
persons respecting themselves and one another would seem to require that 
their common plans be both rational and complementary . . . .* * * Thus what is 
necessary is that there should  be for each person at least one community of 
shared interests to which he belongs and where he finds his endeavors 
confirmed by his associates. * * * This democracy in judging each other‘s aims is 
the foundation of self-respect in a well-ordered society.‖       
 
64
 See NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 1177a 17-19 (page 163 of the Terence Irwin translation, 2d 
ed., 1999):   
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articulate them, illustrate them, and set them in context.   The respectful speaker 
may propound insights into the good aspects of the person whom he respects, 
promoting  his self-knowledge.     
 
          Mendacity displays the opposite tendencies, conducing to foolishness and 
confusion.  Mendacity tends towards the inscription of false sayings on the tablet 
of the mind, and thence at implanting false belief.  It therefore relies for its 
efficacy on evading the hearer‘s critical faculties.  Not infrequently a willful 
deceiver seeks to occlude the rationality of his hearer.  He may promote 
intellectual vice:  credulity, for example, and inaccuracy of expression or 
sloppiness of nomenclature (―talking rot‖).  He may undermine the hearer‘s 
confidence in his own judgment, encourage him to endorse conventional 
prejudices or incite him to practice facile ideologizing.  Systematic practices of 
disrespect may have similar effects, tending, when they are carried to an 
extreme, to the destruction of the victim‘s confidence in his judgment and to the 
undermining of his capacity for firmness in the right.   They may induce self-
hatred and provoke  mutinous passions.  Carried to an extreme, they induce that 
state of intense discomfort identified by von Doderer:  an inability to ―endure 
himself‖; a desire ―to change the general situation because of the impossibility or 
untenability of his own position‖; even a longing to alter ―the fundamentals of 
life in general.‖65   
 
         Veracity and respect confer the greater benefit when they emerge from an 
authoritative source, because they are thence the more widely heard and the 
more readily credited.  They promote the greater benefit when they deal with 
important topics and commend significant merit.  Judicial opinions, statements 
from the bench, and much other official legal speech deploy an apparatus of 
learning.  They employ a unique, juristic idiom which links them to the 
modalities of firm judgment and to the normativity of the public community.   
                                                                                                                                            
―If happiness [eudaemonia:  the final good for man] is activity in accord with 
virtue, it is reasonable for it to accord with the supreme virtue, which will be 
the virtue of the best thing.  The best is understanding . . . and to understand 
what is fine and divine,  by being itself either divine or the most divine element 
in us.  Hence complete happiness will be its activity in  accord with its proper 
virtue and . . . this activity is the activity of study.‖   
 
―Study‖ is a translation of a cognate of  theorein.  Irwin explains: ―In Aristotle‘s most 
specialized use, theorein refers to the contemplative study that he identifies as 
HAPPINESS, or with a part of it.  This is study in the sense in which I ‗study‘ a face or a 
scene that I already have in full view . . . .‖.  Terence Irwin, ―Glossary,‖ in id.   
 
65
 I HEIMITO VON DODERER, THE DEMONS 491 (Richard & Clara Winston, trans., 
1961).   
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They propound weighty judgments of guilt and innocence, right and wrong, 
lawful and unlawful.  They may, when things are done especially well, afford 
exemplars of wisdom.  Veracity and respect from legal officials promote those 
virtues in society generally; mendacity and disrespect promote the 
corresponding vices. A leading work confirms that the law ―changes 
appearances about what is right and normal and, with that, the entire 
configuration of social pressures that operate on the individual.‖66   ―Law and 
public policy teach people how to think as well as how to feel about social issues 
. . . .‖.67     
 
       Judicial mendacity and disrespect are for similar reasons likely to be 
especially destructive.   Magistrate Lewis‘ comment about ―little dogs,‖ quoted at 
the outset of this Article, left a mark on Tom which, long afterwards, had still not 
faded; likely it had a similar effect on his young wife Doris, and perhaps on 
Walter and Norma as well.  Both marriages were, we can surmise, deeply 
embarrassed.          
 
B.  Effects on the Hearer’s Relationship with the Law.  
 
       Veracity and respect in matters pertaining to the law promote justice on the 
part of the people who support and obey it.   
 
          The point is not merely that you can comply only if you know what the law 
requires, nor that your expectations of respect or fear of disrespect might 
motivate you to obey.  The most pathological of regimes might endorse a limited 
degree of veracity and support some practices of respect merely in order to 
secure obedience.   The point, rather, concerns your ability to support the law 
well and to participate in the legal system as a fully just person should.  These 
projects require an understanding of the law‘s purposes and aims, and indeed an 
appreciation of the ethical basis of the legal system and of law itself. 
 
         Aristotle develops the underlying ethics.  ―[P]eople who do just acts are not 
necessarily just, i.e. those who do the acts ordained by the laws either 
                                               
66 DENNIS CHUNG, RATIONAL LIVES:  NORMS AND VALUES IN POLITICS AND 
SOCIETY 207 (2000).   See Seana Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 
HARV. L. REV. 708, 749 et seq. (2007)(proposing that the law should ―respect [citizens‘] 
basic, reasonable interests in leading moral lives‖ and foster ―character traits‖ which 
support ―the flourishing of just institutions and cultures.‖  Shiffrin urges that the laws 
not ―severely conflict with social morality.  Diverge too severely and the law 
undermines moral culture and ―render[s] moral compliance precious or alien.‖). 
  
67 DENNIS CHUNG, op. cit.,  at 209. 
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unwillingly or owing to ignorance.‖68  Fully meritorious obedience – full justice 
in relations with the law  – cannot be founded mainly in fear or in unconsidered 
habituation.   It cannot be the product of   psychological conditioning nor the 
effect of indoctrination in ideological  pseudologia.   It cannot be based on 
ignorance.  It cannot be based in the timorous impulses of those who lack self-
respect.  
 
         The fully just person‘s actions are taken only after ―consideration and 
deliberation.‖69  These projects can progress only if they are based upon 
knowledge and understanding,  bearing fruit in firm conclusions which can be 
commended as ―deliberate opinion.‖70  The just person achieves  balanced 
assessments, develops an understanding of how his actions may relate to the 
basic good,71 and arrives at  decisions:72  firm decisions, firmly rooted.73   A just 
                                               
68 NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1144a 14-15 (W.D. Ross, trans., rev. J.O. Urmson) , in II 
THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1729, 1807 (Jonathan Barnes, ed. 1984) 
(available on past masters database).  Here is a fuller quotation: 
 
―As we say that some people who do just acts are not necessarily just, i.e. those 
who do the acts ordained by the laws either unwillingly or owing to ignorance 
or for some other reason and not for the sake of the acts themselves (though, to 
be sure, they do what they should and all the things that the good man ought), 
so is it, it seems, that in order to be good one must be in a certain state when 
one does the several acts, i.e. one must do them as a result of choice and for the 
sake of the acts themselves.―         
 
Id. 1144a 14-20.  Portions of this passage are revisited, and the translator‘s selection of  
the word ―choice‖ is criticized, in a footnote shortly infra. 
 
69 ARISTOTLE, EUDEMIAN ETHICS  1226b 7-9 (W.D. Ross et al. trans.), in II THE 
COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1922,  1942 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984)(available on past 
masters database)(―[C]hoice is not merely simply picking but picking one thing before 
another; and this is impossible without consideration and deliberation; therefore choice 




71 Irwin comments, ―deliberation about what promotes an end, is necessary for choosing 
the correct actions for their own sakes (i.e. as part of the conception of happiness that 
one has reached by deliberation.‖).   ―Notes‖ in ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS  
172, 252 (Terence Irwin trans., 2d ed., 1999). 
 
72 Id.  1144a 18-20 (page 97) (commending – as the ―type of action in the state that makes 
[one] a good person,‖ – action taken ―because of decision and for the sake of the actions 
themselves.‖).  Compare the Ross translation:  ―as a result of choice and for the sake of 
the acts themselves.‖ (W.D. Ross, trans., rev. J.O. Urmson, in II THE COMPLETE 
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person‘s decisions to comply with the law, and  to support it in other ways,  are 
firmly based upon an appreciation of the good of law in general, the justice of the 
particular law applicable to the matter at hand, and the good of his actions in 
respecting it.  
 
          Veracity promotes the knowledge which is the basis of consideration and 
deliberation.  It grounds deliberation and encourages the practices of reason.  
Respect supports knowledge of self-worth, and thus firmness in the right. 
 
              Mendacity discourages and thwarts those projects.  Systematic and 
thoroughgoing mendacity aims to thwart them, and sometimes at the most 
fundamental level.  Tyrants base their power not on reasoned consent but on fear 
or confusion.  They therefore become enemies of reasoned discourse and 
suppressers of their subjects‘ self-respect.  Mao Tse-Tung banned the use of 
irony.  A  biographer reports: 
 
―Helen Snow, wife of Edgar Snow, told us that in 1937, when she was in 
Yenan, people could still say things like ‗There goes God‘ behind Mao‘s 
                                                                                                                                            
WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1729, 1807 (Jonathan Barnes, ed., 1984).  The word translated 
―decision‖ here is prohairesis; Irwin observes:  ―Many translators use ‗choice‘ to translate 
it, but this is a misleading rendering, since Aristotle allows choice (hairesis) without 
deliberation or decision, and such choice does not count as prohairesis.‖ (Page 322 of the 
Irwin translation cited above.).      
73 See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1105a 28-34 (Terence Irwin trans., 2d ed., 
1999, at 22): 
 
―[F]or actions in accord with the virtues to be done temperately or justly it does 
not suffice that they themselves have the right qualities.  Rather, the agent must 
also be in the right state when he does them.  First, he must know [that he is 
doing virtuous actions]; second, he must decide on them, and decide on them 
for themselves; and, third, he must do them from a firm and unchanging state.‖ 
     
(The bracketed words are interpolations by Irwin).  Irwin comments:   
 
―The value of virtuous actions, as opposed to a craftsman‘s production . . . , is 
not simply determined by its efficiency in producing a product; it also has its 
characteristic motive.  The value of virtue is intrinsic; virtuous action is not 
valuable simply as a means to some further result (e.g., acting kindly is not 
simply a means to making someone feel better).  The intrinsic value of virtue 
reflects the virtuous person‘s motive . . . .‖   
 
―Notes,‖ in Id. at  172, 196.  
        
 
 27 
back.  But seven years on, no one dared say anything remotely so 
flippant.  Mao had not only banned irony and satire (officially, since 
spring 1942), but criminalized humour itself.  The regime invented a new 
catch-all offence – ―Speaking Weird Words‖ – under which anything 
from skepticism to complaining to simply wise-cracking could lead to 
being labeled a spy. 
 
    ―Mao had decided that he did not want active, willing cooperation 
(willingness, after all, could be withdrawn).  He did not want volunteers.  
He needed a machine, so that when he pressed the button, all its cogs 
would operate in unison.  And he got it.‖74   
 
 C.  Effects on the Law and Those Who Speak for it. 
 
        Veracity and respect serve obvious instrumental goods in keeping the 
wheels of government and law aligned.   More basically:  veracity and respect 
promote the fundamental good of being a judge or other legal official.  Truthful 
and respectful dialogue within the judiciary, for example, helps make judges 
fully just.  This is so not only in the sense that it refines their conclusions, but also 
because it deepens their understanding.   This makes them more just  – noting 
again Aristotle‘s insight that to be fully just requires not only arriving at the just 
result but also approaching it through deliberation and embracing it with 
thoughtful understanding.  Furthermore, truthful and respectful disclosure to 
litigants and the citizenry generally extends the beneficence of the legal official.  It 
makes him co-author of the justice of the citizen.      
 
      Judges who misstate doctrine or mischaracterize facts risk the distortion of 
their own capacity for clarity of thought, truthfulness and respect.  The liar 
―paints a false picture:‖ he becomes the illusionist of the false world that 
develops in the listener‘s mind.  The liar risks becoming entangled in his own 
nets, crediting his own falsehoods and inhabiting, to some degree, the false 
world he has constructed.75 As Dostoyevsky puts it: 
 
                                               
74 JUNG CHANG & JON HALLIDAY, MAO:  THE UNKNOWN STORY 247 (2005). 
75
 See generally Charles C. Dike, Madalon Baranoski & Ezra E.H. Grifith, Pathological 
Lying Revisited, 33 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 342, 343  (2005)(available on 
line, accessed July 6, 2009)(according to one line of analysis, ―The lie ultimately wins 
power over the pathological liar, so that mastery over his or her own lie is lost.‖).  A 
subsequent work, not revisiting  this line of analysis, is Charles C. Dike, Pathological 
Lying:  Symptom or Disease? 25 PSYCHIATRIC TIMES No.7  (June 1, 2008) 
(available on line, accessed July 6, 2009).  
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 ―[t]he man who lies to himself and listens to his own lie comes to such a 
pass that he cannot distinguish the truth within him, or around him, and 
so loses all respect for himself and for others.‖76    
 
       Within a legal system, these pathologies may reinforce each other. An 
apparatus of functionaries each of whom is lying to himself and others, 
endorsing some sloganeering ideology, will occlude the relationships among its 
own members, none of whom will be keen on an intensely honest association 
with anyone.   In some Twentieth-Century regimes, officials came to feel that 
their collaborators were threats; as indeed anyone is a threat who might display, 
as in a mirror, some portion of the concealed veracity.   The safest associate 
would be someone neither intelligent nor articulate nor generous with the truth.  
The mendacious functionary therefore seeks associates who deceive and conceal.  
To quote von Doderer: 
 
―[S]much relationships depend upon the involutions of . . . doctrine . . . . 
That is why it so often happens that the revolutionary finds himself in a 
group of persons essentially hostile to him . . . . [I]n such groups murder 
goes the rounds like a bean-bag.‖77   
 
D.  Effects on the Family.  
 
       Practices of veracity and respect are central to a successful marriage, and to 
other relationships within the family as well.   Studies from the social sciences 
report the adverse effects of marital incommunicatively and stonewalling78 and 
the beneficial effects of practices of communicativity and  respect.79 
                                               
76 FYODOR DOSTOYEVSKY,  THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV 37 (Constance Black 
Garnett, trans., 1945).  The passage – a speech by Fr. Zosima -- continues: 
 
―And having no respect he ceases to love, and in order to occupy and distract 
himself without love he gives way to passions and coarse pleasures, and sinks 
to bestiality in his vices, all from continual lying to other men and to himself. 
The man who lies to himself can be more easily offended than anyone. You 
know it is sometimes very pleasant to take offence, isn‘t it? A man may know 
that nobody has insulted him, but that he has invented the insult for himself, 
has lied and exaggerated to make it picturesque, has caught at a word and 
made a mountain out of a molehill — he knows that himself, yet he will be the 
first to take offence, and will revel in his resentment till he feels great pleasure 
in it, and so pass to genuine vindictiveness.‖ 
 
77 I HEIMITO VON DODERER, THE DEMONS 491 (Richard & Clara Winston, trans., 1961). 
 
78 Notably John Mordecai Gottman & Robert Wayne Levenson, The Timing of Divorce:  
Predicting When a Couple Will Divorce Over a 14-Year Period, 62 J. MARRIAGE & FAMILY 
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         Practices of veracity and respect develop in large part under the influence of 
similar practices on the part of others.  This is strongly supported in the area of 
childhood moral development by studies in ―social learning theory‖ and cognitive 
development.80   Common sense would suggest similar conclusions about adults.  
Where veracity is little admired, you stand to gain little respect by practicing it.  
Where people are generally lying, you tend to disrespect them.  Where you are 
held in low esteem, you are tempted to hit back by disrespecting others.  When 
you disrespect people generally, one of the normal motives for telling them the 
truth is absent.   
 
           Historically, government and family have widely been regarded as 
analogues.   The family has been regarded as a ―little state‖ or a ―little 
commonwealth‖;81 marriage as ―pre-eminently the basis of civil institutions‖;82 
                                                                                                                                            
737 (2000)(available on jstor); John M. Gottman, James Coan, Sybil Carrere & Catherine 
Swanson,  Predicting Marital Happiness and Stability from Newlywed Interactions, 60 J. 
MARRIAGE & FAMILY 5 (1998)(available on jstor).   
 
79 E.g. Paul R. Amato, The Impact of Family Formation Change on the Cognitive, Social, and 
Emotional Well-Being of the Next Generation, 15 MARRIAGE & CHILD WELLBEING 75, 85  
(2005)(available on jstor)(―Another benefit of a positive co-parental relationship is the 
modeling of interpersonal skills, such as showing respect, communicating clearly, and 
resolving disputes through negotiation and compromise.  Children who learn these 
skills by observing their parents have positive relationships with peers and, later, with 
intimate partners.‖). 
 
80 See  Lawrence J. Walker, Karl H. Hennig & Tobias Krettenauer, Parent and Peer Contexts 
for Children’s Moral Reasoning Development, 71 CHILD DEVELOPMENT 1033, 1033 (2000) 
(available on jstor): 
 
―Psychoanalytic theory emphasizes early parent/child relationships in the 
development of conscience through the mechanism of identification and 
consequent internalization of values.  Social-learning theory . . . emphasizes the 
power of models and so has also focused on parents‘ role in displaying and 
reinforcing appropriate behaviors.  Cognitive development theory . . . . holds 
that interactions with peers are more potent . . . .‖.   
 
See generally Gareth B. Matthews, Concept Formation and Moral Development,  in 
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 175, 185 
(James Russell ed., 1987); A. Bandura, Social Cognitive Theory:  An Agentic Perspective, 52 
ANNUAL REVIEW OF PSYCHOLOGY 1 (2001), available at 
www.des.emory.edu/mfp/Bandura2001ARPr.pdf.  Cf. JOHN SNAREY, HOW  
FATHERS CARE FOR THE NEXT GENERATION: A FOUR-DECADE STUDY (1993). 
81
 John Witte Jr., The Tradition of Traditional Marriage, in MARRIAGE AND SAME-SEX UNIONS: A 
DEBATE 47, 58 (Lynn D. Wardle et al., eds., 2003).  See also JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM 
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governments have been regarded as similar to fathers.  Episodes of distortion in 
political bonds are often accompanied by systematic disruptions in familial 
bonds as well.   Veracity and respect by those who speak for the law are likely to 
be promoted by the example of similar practices within the family and thus to 




IV.   WHAT CONSTITUTES VERACITY AND RESPECT ON THE PART OF 
THOSE WHO SPEAK FOR THE LAW?  SOME SPECIAL CASES.   
 
A.   Technical Terms; Legal Fictions.   
 
No one would convict the Treasury Department of mendacity if its 
regulations determined a company‘s ―net operating loss‖ by using elements 
which would not seem pertinent to a lay person. This is because their context 
signals the likelihood that they bear a special meaning.  There is no ordinary 
English understanding of ―net operating loss.‖83  
 
           Principles of veracity and respect have more traction where legal speech 
has an ―ordinary English‖ ring to it and the indicia of technical meaning are 
slight.  Courts have applied admiralty law to hold a ship to be  ―unseaworthy‖ 
which has slop on the railing, dangerous but not likely to cause the vessel to 
sink.84  This legal fiction may fall short of full veracity and respect, but the edge 
of the criticism is blunted by the context: the opinions of judges applying a 
                                                                                                                                            




 ―In every enlightened government [marriage] is pre-eminently the basis of civil institutions, 
and thus an object of the deepest public concern.  In this light, marriage is more than a contract.  
It is not a mere matter of pecuniary consideration. It is a great public institution, giving character 
to our whole civil polity.'‖ Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 213 (1888), quoting Noel v. Ewing, 9 
Ind. 37  (1857).  
 
83 See  note 54, supra, explaining why it is not mendacious to say ―I am going to powder 
my nose‖ or ―the batter walked‖ even when those statements, taken literally, would 
seem to mean something contrary to the facts.  
 
84 See ROBERT FORCE, A.N. YIANNOPOULOS & MARTIN DAVIES, ADMIRALTY 
AND MARITIME LAW 453 (abridged ed.,  2006). 
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specialized branch of the law – and by the audience: a specialized industry.  
These circumstances imply the likelihood of technical and unusual meanings.85  
 
          Principles of veracity and respect are violated, however, when a judge or 
legislature, speaking without sign of technicality and out into the community at 
large, using what appears to be the community‘s language – albeit having a 
technical or variant meaning in mind – characterizes persons as something 
different than what they are in an important way.  Those principles are violated, 
for example, when the law describes someone as a thief who has innocently 
purchased  stolen property.86  Modifiers such as ―constructively‖ or ―legally‖ or 
―deemed to be‖ may not be enough to absolve the speaker then.  A good thought 
experiment is to imagine yourself in open court or town meeting being told, ―Mr. 
Reader, you are a thief.‖  Or, ―Mr. Reader, you are legally a thief.‖  Or, ―you are a 
thief in the eyes of the law,‖ or even ―you are a constructive thief.‖  If in fact you 
were merely the good-faith purchaser of the stolen goods these statements would 
be mendacious and disrespectful.  
 
B. Speech About Social Institutions.  
   
       Establishing the truth about a social institution presents special complexities.    
Take hospitals and the profession of nursing as examples.   
 
       1.  Legal-Positivist Approaches. – The law licenses hospitals and nurses and 
establishes many of their standards of practice.  Legal doctrine thus provides one 
basis for assessing the veracity and respectfulness of those who speak about 
hospitals and nurses.  This basis alone establishes that it would be mendacious 
and disrespectful to deny that Massachusetts General was a hospital or that its 
RNs were authorized to practice nursing.     
 
        2.  Social-Positivist Approaches. – Legal analysis provides only part of the 
story.  Hospitals and the healing professions organize across national 
boundaries, performing much the same functions under different legal systems.  
They survive regime change without basic alteration, and some might survive 
                                               
85 Remove the matter from its specialized context and the criticisms are not  blunted.  
Were a federal judge to state unqualifiedly in an after-dinner speech that Carnival 
Cruise Line ships were frequently unseaworthy he would be subject to criticism for 
mendacity and disrespect without the ―technical meaning‖ excuse being available to 
him. 
 
86 See Bruhn v. Virginia, Record No. 0818-00-2  (2002)(Bumgardner, J., dissenting )(―The  
General Assembly in 1847-48 enacted a revised Criminal Code that declared that any 
person who receives stolen property . . .‗shall be deemed guilty of larceny thereof. . . .‘‖).   
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the withering away of the state.     Hospital administrators and nurses do not 
look only to the law.   They look also to custom and social morality:  to the 
expectations and beliefs of patients, families, and the community as a whole.  
 
      A supreme court justice would violate principles of veracity if he ruled that a 
country club was a hospital or that a building contractor was a nurse.    This 
would be true where no precedent or statute bore on the matter.  His opinion 
would conflict with the understanding of hospitals and nursing as established by 
society.     
 
          Reliance on social understandings has much to commend it.  It leads the 
law out of the self-referential cave, discouraging the practices of pseudologia.   It 
leads the law to speak to the community in the community‘s own terms,  
promoting veracity in society generally. It leads the law to take community 
standards into account in allocating respect, reinforcing the community‘s system 
of honor. 
 
           3.  Beyond Law and Social Morality. -- Hospitals and the healing professions 
exist across cultural boundaries just as they do across legal ones.  They do not 
always change when culture changes.  Physicians and nurses consider, besides 
the law and social morality, the requirements of patient health.   
 
         Suppose a society in which, owing to ignorance, clinics leeched blood and 
hospitals, not understanding the medical value of disinfectants, omitted to use 
them except for cosmetic and janitorial purposes.  Social standards might lead a 
judge to conclude that the leeching clinic was a medical facility and to deny that 
cleansing workers were performing the function of nurses.  But if new medical 
research established to a judge‘s satisfaction that leeching blood has no medical 
value and that disinfectants prevent infection, she might conclude instead that a 
bleeding clinic was not truly a medical establishment, and that a profession 
devoted to applying the leeches was not properly a branch of nursing.  Similarly, 
she might conclude that cleansing workers formerly classified among the 
housekeepers were properly speaking performing the functions of nurses.  She 
might say these things in a judicial opinion without violating the principles of 
veracity or respect.  Principles of veracity and respect require consideration of 
objective goods.87 
 
                                               
87 A deeper sort of positivism might be employed, as something of an intermediate 
approach.  Such an approach would proceed by looking beyond the specifics of social  
morality to the principles underlying them. Normally a society‘s social morality of 
medicine will reflect its commitment to health.   The judge can be guided by the 
principles underlying  the specifics of community speech and practices.   
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       4.  Mixed Cases; Hard Cases. – What where intractable conflicts arise between 
the determinations of the legal order and the social, or between legal and social 
norms on the one hand and basic nonpositive considerations on the other?  What, 
for example, where the law and the social order supported leeching and 
remained intransigent in that support despite the emergence of conflicting 
evidence about patient health?  What if public opinion and the positive law rated 
tradition higher than health? 
 
      There often is no easy answer in such cases.  Principles of veracity and respect 
should lead a judge or other legal official candidly to depict the divergences 
involved in the normative situation, encouraging a dialogue which might 
eventually lead to restoration of congruity and good sense. 
   
 
V.  IMPLICATIONS FOR SPEECH ABOUT THE FAMILY. 
 
         Several examples here illustrate how the requirements of veracity and 
respect apply to speech about the family. 
 
 A.  The Existence of the Wife.  
 
       Historically, some legal authorities endorsed the doctrine that a married 
woman was not a person or, perhaps, not a separate person.  Blackstone‘s 
Commentaries stated that ―the very being or legal existence of the woman is 
suspended during the marriage.‖88   
 
                                               
88  WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND Bk 
One, ch. 15  (1765-69), available at 
http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/blackstone/index.html (accessed July 11, 2009):  
 
 ―By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very 
being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at 
least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband; under whose 
wing, protection and cover, she performs everything . . . .‖  
 
 See  Boone v. Boone, 345 S.C. 8, 11, 546 S.E.2d 191, 192 (2001)(referring to the historical 
―legal fiction that husband and wife share the same identity in law, namely that of the 
husband.‖); Pelzer, Rodgers & Co. v.  Campbell & Co., 15 S.C. 581, 588 (1881)(under the 




       It must be conceded that, as Aristotle observes, there is a sort of  unity between 
close friends.89 Scripture uses the term ―one flesh.‖  Nevertheless it makes no 
sense at all to pretend that when a friendship or a marriage or some other close 
affiliation between two people forms up, one of them ceases to exist.  Were that 
to happen, there would no longer be a friendship, or a relationship of any sort.  
  
       Statements that the existence of a woman is suspended during marriage are 
thus false, philosophically and psychologically; and they are of course also 
disrespectful.  Insofar as they attempt to depict the social facts of marriage, they 
are equally preposterous, diverging from that institution as it is discussed and 
lived today or in Blackstone‘s time or during the centuries when the common 
law was formed.  (Was the Wife of Bath a separate person?)  Such statements can 
be deplored as violating the principles of veracity and respect, and any defense 
based on the observation that they are merely legal fictions or technical speech 
can be rejected for the reasons set forth in Part IV A, supra. 
 
       These conclusions can be endorsed without debating consequentialist 
arguments such as that based on protecting the woman from unfair bargains she 
might enter into without the advice of her husband, or that adducing the 
importance of domestic peace (―where two or more persons are destined to pass 
their lives together, one should be endued with such a pre-eminence as may 
prevent or terminate all contestation.‖).90  
 
B.  Spousal Status Outside of Marriage.  
 
       Ontario law endorses the proposition that people who are not married to one 
another are nevertheless spouses.  This doctrinal misadventure has introduced 
vast uncertainty into the meaning of the term ―spouse,‖ and has led on to legal 
                                               
89
 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1170b 7-9 (Terence Irwin trans., 2d ed., 1999, at 
150)(―The excellent person is related to his friend in the same way as he is related to himself, 
since a friend is another himself.‖). 
 
90 PEREGRINE BINGHAM, THE LAW OF INFANCY AND COVERTURE 182  (2d 
American ed., 1849).  The passage continues:   ―And why is this pre-eminence 
exclusively vested in man?  --  Simply, because he is the stronger.  . . . [G]ive but the 
legal authority to the wife, and every moment would produce a revolt on the part of the 
husband, only to be quelled by assistance from without.‖). For a learned discussion see I 
CHARLES J. REID, JR., LUCIFER‘S CHILDREN:  A STORY OF  FREE LOVE, 
RELIGION, POLITICS, AND LAW IN  NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA ch. 5 
(forthcoming). 
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doctrines which diverge  from social understandings and which  embarrass 
doctrinal development, as will here be explained. 91   
 
       The Ontario Family Law Act provides that the term ―spouse‖ ―includes 
either of two persons who are not married to each other and have cohabited . . . 
continuously for a period of not less than three years.‖92  ―Cohabit‖ is defined in 
section 1(1) as meaning ―to live together in a  conjugal relationship, whether 
within or outside marriage.‖  (The term ―conjugal relationship‖ is not there 
defined.).    
 
       Leading cases leave the Ontario law fluid.  The court in Mahoney v. King 
identified seven factors each with subparts amounting to twenty-two in the 
aggregate.93 Not included among these components is any oath or pledge or 
assurance that the parties might have made to one another.  There is no mention 
of love.94  There is no reference to a duty to honor and cherish.  There is no direct 
mention of an intention to remain lastingly loyal. One component, to be sure, is 
that of  fidelity, phrased as a question:  ―Did they maintain an attitude of fidelity 
to each other?‖95  (Note the implication that fidelity is attitudinal, rather than a 
                                               
91
 See generally Ruth L. Deech, The Case Against Legal Recognition of Cohabitation, 29 
INTERNATIONAL & COMP.. L. Q. 480 (1980). 
92
 R.S.O. 1990, c. F-3, s. 29 (―In this Part, . . .   ‗spouse‘ means a spouse as defined in 
subsection 1 (1), and in addition includes either of two persons who are not married to 
each other and have cohabited,  (a) continuously for a period of not less than three years, 
or  (b)  in a relationship of some permanence, if they are the natural or adoptive parents 
of a child.‖).        
     Section One provides that  ―‘cohabit‘ means to live together in a conjugal relationship, 
whether within or outside marriage‖ and that ―‘spouse‘ means either of two persons 
who,  (a) are married to each other, or  (b)  have together entered into a marriage that is 
voidable or void, in good faith on the part of a person relying on this clause to assert any 
right.‖    
    Several other Ontario provisions define ―spouse‖ in unusual ways, as cited and 
described in an appendix to Rosenberg v. College of Physicians and Surgeons, cited infra. 
93 [1998] R.F.L. (4th) 361 (Ont. Gen. Div.)  paragraph 6, citing Molodowich v. Penttinen 
(1980), 17 R.F.L. (2d) 376 (Ont. Dist. Ct.) . 
 
94 Though one question on the court‘s list is ―[w]hat were their feelings towards each 
other?‖.   Paragraph 6 of the opinion; item (ii)(c). 
 
95 Paragraph 6 of the opinion; item (ii)(b).  (Item two is ―Sexual and Personal Behaviour.‖). 
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matter of belief or obligation).  Absent from among the elements is any reference 
to exclusivity.   
 
 
        Ontario law endorses the conclusion that you can be one person‘s spouse at 
the same time that you are married to someone else.  In  Sullivan v. Letnik,96 an 
Ontario court held that a cohabiting couple had established spousal status even 
though each was already married.97  In Mahoney v. King, Sandra Mahoney 
claimed that she was her ex-lover‘s ―spouse‖ even though he was married to 
someone else during his affair with Mahoney and continued throughout to live 
with his wife.  The court held that Mahoney‘s claim was sufficiently meritorious 
to go to trial.  It observed that ―[i]ssues relating to the definition of spouse are in 
transition.‖98    
 
 
        Absent from among the definitional components is, astonishingly, any 
requirement that the couple reside together for three years, despite what would 
seem to be the clear mandate of the statutory  phrase ―live together in a conjugal 
relationship . . . continuously for a period of not less than three years.‖ In the 
Sullivan case, the court held that continuity of cohabitation was established 
across a lengthy time period when Mrs. Sullivan refused even to set foot on the  
                                                                                                                                            
 
96 [1994] 5 R.F.L. (4th) 313 (Ont. Unif. Fam. Ct.), rev‘d in part on other grounds [1997] 27 R.F.L. 
(4
th
) 79 (ont. C.A.) (applying a statute in force prior to the present Family Law Act).   See 
Perkovic v. McClyment, [2008] 57 R.F.L. (6
th
) 57 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.)(ascribing spousal status to a 
man who was married to someone else).   The case-law on these issues is discussed in 
MARY JANE MOSSMAN, FAMILIES AND THE LAW IN CANADA 510 et seq. (2004).    
  
97
 The court in the Mahoney case, discussed just infra, makes this conclusion explicit, stating (in 
paragraph 7 of its opinion): 
 
― It appears from the caselaw that parties may cohabit within the meaning of the Family 
Law Act when one party is still legally married to another. In Sullivan v. Letnik (1994), 5 
R.F.L. (4th) 313 (Ont U.F.C.) Beckett found: 
 
I am of the opinion that the parties cohabited in a conjugal relationship after June 
2
nd
, 1981, and certainly since January 2
nd
 of 1985 when the applicant and her 




 [1998] R.F.L. (4
th
) 361 (Ont. Gen. Div.)  The quoted language is in paragraph 26.  
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love nest -- a boat called the Jardin – ―because of the business turmoil between 
them and her fear of violence.‖ The court noted: 
 
 ―that did not mean that the relationship had terminated. * * * Whether 
couples are separated is a question of intent, not geography; at least one 
of the parties must intend to permanently sever the relationship.‖99 
 
       Ontario law on these matters is mendacious.   To call Mrs. Sullivan the 
spouse of Mr. Letnik and to call Ms. Mahoney the spouse of her lover is contrary 
to social fact.   Ontario law can also be convicted of disrespect.  It manifests an 
uncaring attitude to identify Mrs. Sullivan as the spouse of someone she has 
never married and whom she is episodically loathe even to approach.   
 
      The fluidity of Ontario law as to the definition of ―spouse‖ embarrasses 
doctrinal development on related matters.   In Rosenberg v. College of Physicians & 
Surgeons, a physician whose license was revoked owing to his having had sexual 
relations with a patient advanced as a defense the assertion that the patient was 
also his spouse.  The prohibition was limited by no express spousal exception, 
but common sense might demand that one be inferred.100  Surely the drafters did 
not intend to prohibit sexual relations between husband and wife.101 Dr. 
Rosenberg‘s patient, however,  was not his wife.  Dr. Rosenberg maintained, 
rather, that she was  his ―spouse‖ owing to cohabitation. The court rejected Dr. 
Rosenberg‘s argument and refused to infer the proposed spousal exception on 
the grounds that ―the term ‗spouse‘ has no clear definition in  law,‖ and that 
―‘spousal relationship‘ means one thing in one context and something quite 
different in another‖102 and that as a result such an exception would ―open a 
                                               
99
 See also Stephen v. Stawecki, [2006] 32 R.F. L. (6
th
) 282 (Ont. C. A.), affirming [2005] 32 
R.F.L. (6
th
) 273 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); Sturgess v. Shaw (2002), 31 R.F.L. 5
th
  453 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J);  
Mahoney v. King, [1998] R.F.L. (4
th) 361 paragraph 9 (Ont. Gen. Div.)(―parties may be found to 
be cohabiting, even if they maintain separate residences.‖).  
 
    A further point about the Ontario definition of ―spouse‖ is that by its terms it  applies only to 
Part Three of the act (―Support Obligations‖).  The term ―spouse‖ is extensively used throughout 
the act (as of course are terms which would normally be cognates, such as marriage, family, and 
so on), but outside of Part Three ―spouse‖ is not within the extended definition quoted above.  It 
seems you may be a  spouse for some purposes but not necessarily for others under Ontario law. 
 
100
 Rosenberg v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (2006), 216 O.A.C. 358, 2006 
CarswellOnt 6759 (Ont. C. A.) .  
 
101
 Even ―touching of a sexual nature‖ and ―behaviour or remarks of a sexual nature‖ were 
prohibited.  Id.] paragraph 6.   
 
102
 Id. paragraph 40.  The court attached an appendix which charted the varying definitions under 
twenty-six Ontario statutes and regulations.  
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significant hole‖ in the disciplinary requirements.103 After this decision, it 
remained unclear  whether a physician in Ontario who afforded medical 
treatment to his wife or her husband might also engage in marital sexual 
relations.     
 
C.  The Status of the Parties to a Marriage  
which One Spouse Seeks to Dissolve on a No-Fault Basis.  
 
       No-fault divorce presents difficult problems.   The analysis depends in major 
part on the nature of the no-fault law and on the understanding of marriage and 
divorce which obtains between the parties and within their society.  The matter 
can be illustrated with two narratives.  (Likely most cases in contemporary 
America fall somewhere between them.). 
 
       Case One. – Wally and Wendy are citizens of a country in northwestern 
Europe which has statutorily recognized unilateral no-fault divorce for decades, 
and whose social order concurs in an understanding that if a couple is 
incompatible, or if either of the spouses is  dissatisfied,  to divorce is the 
reasonable course of action. The law (and social opinion) minimize post-
dissolution obligations (there is no alimony; needy ex-spouses are cared for 
through the social services system).  Wally and Wendy are not much different in 
opinion and practice from most members of their society (they are not, for 
example, members of a religious group which teaches divergently on these 
matters).   They were married in a civil ceremony which included no oath.  After 
three years of marriage, Wendy decided she was bored and petitioned for 
divorce.  Wally objected, but the magistrate granted the petition.   
 
      Is the magistrate guilty of mendacity or disrespect?  He may have said 
nothing except that the couple is now divorced.  ―Divorced‖ is a legal term.  It is 
also a term with a social meaning, but the social meaning leans heavily on the 
legal definition.  Perhaps the magistrate has also stated that Wally and Wendy 
―are free to go their own ways‖ and that their ―special obligations to one another 
are at an end.‖  Those statements are not in conflict with the beliefs of that 
society. 
 
       What about looking beyond social morality to considerations of basic 
nonpositive good?  The magistrate might be criticized on such grounds, 
                                                                                                                                            
 
103
 Id. paragraph 42 (characterizing the reasoning of the disciplinary committee).  The court did 
leave  open the possibility that some exception along those lines might later be identified, stating 
that ―the legislation may leave some scope for finding that the [medical-disciplinary] . . . regime 
does not apply to certain relationships.‖  Id. paragraph 44. 
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especially if he went further and stated that marriage is an institution that can be 
dissolved ad libitem, leaving the parties in the same moral situation as had they 
never married in the first place.  Wally‘s and Wendy‘s society‘s social morality 
and positive law are at variance with nonpositive normativity,104 and the conflict 
may be of the intractable sort identified and briefly discussed in section IV B 4¸ 
supra.   
 
          Did we mention that Wally and Wendy have three young children?  The 
divorce is likely to be a disaster for them and for their children‘s children, as 
extensive social science research has come to establish.   This suggests obvious 
consequentialist arguments, and arguments based on considerations of justice, to 
deplore what Wendy has brought about and to encourage reform of the no-fault 
system.   Principles of veracity and respect suggest that the magistrate ought at 
least to introduce these considerations into the discussion.     
 
         Case Two. – Henry and Winona are citizens of a country whose society has 
always endorsed an understanding of marriage as strongly obligatory, 
presumptively indissoluble, and terminable by divorce only on limited grounds 
such as violence and adultery.   The law (and social opinion) insist that some of 
the obligations of marriage survive even divorce:  obligations of support, for 
example, and even personal ex- to ex- visitation.   Henry and Winona wedded in 
a customary ceremony which included an oath of loyalty ―‘til death do us part,‖ 
and through the second year of their marriage adhered in practice and belief to 
their society‘s accepted views.   
 
         During their third marital year Henry became restless and dissatisfied and 
petitioned for divorce.  Bringing his petition before a family-law judge who 
considered himself to be a progressive on marital matters, Henry obtained a 
decree of dissolution without establishing any of the recognized grounds.   Here 
are some of the passages from the judge‘s decree:  
 
―‘[M]arriage today is a home for the heart:  entering, furnishing, and 
exiting that home is your business alone.  Today‘s marriage – from 
whatever angle you look – is justified by the happiness of the pair.‘105  It 
is therefore appropriate that this court recognize, on the basis of 
                                               
104 The ethical bases for this assertion are presented in earlier works by the author of this 
Article:   The Principles of Justice in Procreative Affiliations, in WHAT‘S THE HARM?  
DOES LEGALIZING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE REALLY HARM INDIVIDUALS, 
FAMILIES OR SOCIETY?  125 (Lynn Wardle, ed., 2008); Marriage and the Ethics of Office, 
18 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY  89 (2004), and. 
Marriage and the Good of Obligation, 47 AMERICAN J.   JURISPRUDENCE 41 (2002).    
105 E.J. GRAFF, WHAT IS MARRIAGE FOR?  251 (2004). 
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fundamental fairness and the protection of liberty guaranteed by this 
country‘s constitution, that divorce is available when a marriage has 
irreparably broken down.   
 
     ―This necessarily subjective standard is satisfied whenever, as an 
American authority puts it, one of the parties ‗feels that the marriage 
cannot be salvaged.‘   It is enough that petitioner ‗sincerely believes that 
the marriage has irreparably broken down.‘106 
 
    ―In this case, Petitioner has attested that he has those feelings.  Based 
on this, we conclude that the relationship between him and Respondent 
no longer really is a marriage at all, the essential features of that 
relationship being absent.  For some time Henry and Winona have been,  
and – as we now decree -- they henceforth are, free of any obligations to 
one another and are single persons.‖     
  
This decree violates requirements of veracity and respect.   
       This decree violates requirements of veracity and respect.   
       That this is the case as regards its specificities should be obvious.  That this is 
so in a more basic way can be discerned as well.  It contradicts not only the 
doctrines about marriage endorsed by the society in question but also the 
principles – principles of fidelity and lasting obligation – which that society 
embraces, and which it uses as the basis for the  recognition of marriage.  The 
judge‘s opinion substitutes an ethic of pleasure and impulse.   
 
     The  opinion here displays characteristics similar to those manifested  in the 
shameful statements of Magistrate Lewis in the passage quoted at the outset of 
this Article.  This judge has likened the parties, and indeed has likened all 
married couples, to little dogs. 
 
                                               
106
 Caffyn v. Caffyn, 441 Mass. 487, 494 n. 16, 806 N.E.2d 415, 422 n.16 (2004)(emphasis 
added)(quoting  Comment, The End of Innocence: Elimination of Fault in California Divorce 
Law, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1306, 1319, 1322-1323 (1970). The terms within the single quotes above 
are from this comment as quoted in Caffyn opinion, except that the word ―feels‘ is in the Caffyn 
opinion but not, at that point, in the comment.).   
